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In cases of nuclear or other radiologically relevant 
incidents or accidents (“radiological event”), including 
terrorist attacks, appropriate protection of the public against 
ionising radiation and radioactive contamination is of major 
importance. In such scenarios, radiation protection 
authorities and other decision-makers quickly need reliable 
information based on sound radiological data in order to 
determine and optimize countermeasures. The nuclear 
accidents in Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) are 
major examples where radiation protection measures were 
crucial for preserving a tremendous number of human lives. 
However, certain smaller events have also caused severe 
problems, e.g., the Tokaimura nuclear criticality accident 
(1999). According to the IAEA Safety Standard No. GSR 
Part 7, “Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or 
Radiological Emergency” (1), safety and security measures 
have the shared aim of protecting human life and health as 
well as protecting the environment. This document also 
emphasises the importance of adequate protective measures 
following nuclear and radiological emergencies. Reliable 
radiological data, available at the earliest possible stage, 
are a prerequisite for effectively protecting people from 
such unexpected but potentially highly dangerous events. 
Therefore, the European joint research project 
16ENV04 named “Preparedness”, funded by the European 
Metrology Programme for Innovation and Research 
(EMPIR), is meant to develop reliable instrumentation and 
methods needed in the field of radiation protection in the 
aftermath of a nuclear or radiological emergency. The goal 
is to quickly gather quantitative data on the activity 
concentrations of contaminated areas and dose rate levels 
by aerial measurements, and analyse these air contaminations 
by flexible and transportable air sampling systems. 
For large-area ground contaminations, surveillance by 
unmanned airborne monitoring systems (UAMSs), 
specifically unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped 
with spectrometric detectors, is the best solution to protect 
first responders and other task forces against contaminations 
and hazards due to ionising radiation. However, advanced 
calibration procedures based on reference materials and 
standard radionuclide sources must be elaborated for these 
systems and verified by Monte Carlo simulations. For 
airborne radioactivity monitoring, transportable air 
sampling field stations equipped with high-resolution 
spectrometric detectors and appropriate shielding is needed 
to allow the measurement of radioactivity concentration 
levels in the air of affected areas. After the release of a 
radioactive plume to the atmosphere, the levels of the 
ambient dose equivalent rate and activity concentrations in 
air provide essential information about the progression of 
the radioactive cloud. This information is important for 
decision-makers to be able to take timely and adequate 
countermeasures to protect the members of the public 
against the dangers of ionising radiation.
After a major release of radionuclides, short-term 
decontamination may not always be possible. Hence, 
concepts for long-term measurements have to be developed. 
Metrologically sound data is needed in this field as well, 
because decisions on e.g. decontamination measures or 
release of restricted areas are of vital importance. Passive 
dosimeters must therefore be studied with regard to their 
applicability for this purpose. Furthermore, the 
“Preparedness” project addresses the question whether 
non‑governmental networks could support official dose rate 
data or undermine them because of insufficient quality.
Objectives and Work Package structure
The overall objective of this project is the establishment 
of a metrological basis to support adequate protective 
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measures in the aftermath of nuclear and radiological 
emergencies. To achieve this, the specific objectives of this 
project are (8):
• To develop unmanned aerial detection systems 
installed on aerial vehicles1 and helicopters for the 
remote measurement of dose rates and radioactivity 
concentrations. In addition, to establish novel methods 
applicable to core and remote areas of a nuclear or 
radiological incident for air-based radiological 
measurements including dose rates, radioactivity 
concentrations, traceable calibrations for the 
determination of ground surface activities and 
interpretation methodologies for Rotary-Wing 
Unmanned Airborne Monitoring System (RWUAMS)-
based radiological measurements.
• To develop transportable air-sampling systems for 
immediate information on radioactive contamination 
levels in air. This also includes generating industry 
appropriate pre-production models of modular and 
portable air-sampling systems based on gamma 
spectrometric detectors that can be quickly transported 
to places of interest.
• To investigate the metrological relevance of crowd-
sourced monitoring data on dose rates and provide 
recommendations on the usability of such data. In 
addition, to develop handy detector systems with the 
potential to be used as dose rate measuring instruments 
in governmental and non-governmental applications.
• To establish stable and reproducible procedures to 
measure ambient dose equivalent rates using passive 
dosimetry in order to harmonise passive dosimetry for 
environmental radiation monitoring across Europe.
• To facilitate the take up of the technology and 
measurement infrastructure developed in the project 
by a measurement-supply chain (instrument 
manufacturers, accredited laboratories), organisations 
that develop standards (ISO, IEC), and end-users 
(national nuclear regulatory bodies, decision/policy 
makers e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the European Community Urgent Radiological 
Information Exchange system (ECURIE), the OECD, 
the European Radiation Dosimetry group (EURADOS), 
the United Nations and the World Health Organization 
(WHO).
According to these objectives, the project is structured 
into four technical work packages (WPs):
WP1. Unmanned aerial detection systems: To obtain 
fast and detailed information on contaminations in vast or 
inaccessible areas, which is needed for making decisions 
regarding appropriate countermeasures, mobile detector 
systems for area and air monitoring should be further 
developed and tested in realistic field conditions. For these 
systems, advanced calibration procedures, based on 
reference materials and standard radionuclide sources, must 
be elaborated and verified by Monte Carlo simulations. For 
large-area ground contaminations, monitoring by unmanned 
1 Multi-rotor aerial vehicles are commonly known as drones.
aerial vehicles accompanied by spectrometric detectors is 
the best solution to protect operators against undesirable 
contaminations or irradiation. 
WP2. Transportable air-sampling systems: 
Transportable systems offer flexibility for rapid 
redeployment should conditions change and thus provide 
a cost-effective solution for post-incident monitoring, a goal 
which is in line with (2) of the European Community 
Directorate-General Energy (EC DG ENER). For airborne 
radioactivity monitoring, transportable field stations do not 
yet exist. They will be developed in this project, allowing 
the flexible measurement of radioactivity concentration 
levels in affected areas. The importance of this research 
field is emphasised in EC Report EUR 27224 EN (3). An 
on-site comparison exercise for the new transportable 
systems will be carried out to test their properties in‑field 
and to check the whole measurement chain. Finally, rapid 
radiochemical separation and analysis methods for the 
determination of airborne alpha and beta emitting 
radionuclides will be optimised and further developed as a 
useful complement of airborne radioactivity measurements.
WP3. Non-governmental networks: For several 
decades, radiological monitoring information has been 
provided only by national monitoring networks. In the last 
few years, in addition, non-governmental monitoring 
networks disseminating crowd-sourced data have developed 
rapidly after the disaster at Fukushima. This trend may 
continue in line with the expansion of personal networked 
electronics. Although the active involvement of the public 
should be encouraged, one should be also confident that the 
results measured in this way will not conflict with the 
official measured dose rate values that have established 
traceability to national standards. Metrologically unreliable 
data of simple electronic devices provided by non‑officials 
to the general public and to the media may result in 
unnecessary concern or raise questions about the validity 
of the regular monitoring networks. It is equally possible 
that the large datasets produced through these citizen 
science initiatives can complement official data and provide 
extra insight or early warning of an incident. Hence, non-
governmental monitoring requires a detailed investigation 
of its metrological relevance.
WP4. Passive dosimetry for environmental radiation 
monitoring: In routine monitoring, many national 
measuring bodies in Europe and worldwide use passive 
dosimetry systems to survey nuclear installations at the 
borders of the restricted territories in order to protect the 
public from dangers arising from ionising radiation. If 
passive dosimetry systems are used for environmental 
radiation monitoring in the aftermath of a radiological event, 
the reliability of the measured data is of key importance. 
Hence, harmonised methods are necessary and a detailed 
knowledge of the performance of passive dosimetry systems 
is required in order to allow reliable measurements even at 
low dose levels (a goal in line with (2) of EC DG ENER). 
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Furthermore, there is a work package dealing with the 
dissemination of the results of the “Preparedness” project 
(WP5: “Impact”) and a work package “Management and 
Coordination” (WP6).
“Preparedness” consortium
The “Preparedness” consortium comprises 17 
institutions from 11 European countries and the Joint 
Research Centre of the European Commission, including:
• 3 National Metrology Institutes (NMIs): Physikalisch-
Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB, Germany), Cesky 
Metrologicky Institut (CMI, Czech Republic), NPL 
Management Limited (NPL, UK), 
• 3 Designated Institutions (DIs): Ruđer Bošković 
Institute (IRB, Croatia), Institut Jožef Stefan (JSI, 
Slovenia), Institut za nuklearne nauke Vinča (VINCA, 
Serbia) and
• 11 scientific and technological institutions as well as 
private enterprises: Aristotelio Panepistimio 
Thessalonikis (AUTH, Greece), Bundesamt für 
Strahlenschutz (BfS, Germany),  Centralne 
Laboratorium Ochrony Radiologicznej (CLOR, 
Poland), Universidad del Pais Vasco / Euskal Herriko 
Unibertsitatea (EHU, Spain), Agenzia Nazionale per 
le nuove tecnologie, l’energia e lo sviluppo economico 
sostenibile (ENEA, Italy), Joint Research Centre - 
European Commission (JRC, EC), Kromek Limited 
(Kromek, UK), Vojensky Technicky Ustav SP (MTI, 
Czech Republic), NUVIA a.s. (NUVIA, Czech 
Republic), Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC, 
Spain) and Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie, Centre 
d’Etude de l’Energie Nucléaire, Fondation d’Utilité 
Publique (SCK•CEN, Belgium).
In addition, about 10 further institutions officially 
collaborate with the “Preparedness” consortium and 
exchange know-how and scientific and technological 
results.
FIRST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As a follow-up of the European Joint Research Project 
“Metrology for radiological early warning networks in 
Europe” (MetroERM), the Preparedness project started with 
a considerable background of results achieved by 
MetroERM and published in about 20 peer-reviewed 
publications and numerous conference proceedings.
In the framework of Work Package 1, several detector 
systems were customised for the use on UAV. They are 
based on NaI, CeBr3 and CdZnTe detectors. The systems 
had to be made of lightweight components including 
electronics and control systems. For this purpose, novel 
microelectronics and apt software for the recording of 
spectra and transmission of data had to be developed. The 
simultaneous wireless control of the UAV and the wireless 
transfer of a big amount of measured data are a challenge 
even for modern communication systems. Within the next 
years of the Preparedness project, intercomparison exercises 
with UAV‑based spectrometry systems at flight centers in 
Spain, in the Czech Republic and in Germany will be 
performed to test measuring systems developed within this 
project and to elaborate calibration procedures which are 
needed for quantitative dose rate and activity concentration 
measurements.
In the following, some preliminary results of the 
ongoing work are described. One example is the equipment 
of a UAV with a spectrometer with a CeBr3 scintillation 
crystal with the dimensions of 3.81 cm in diameter and 
3.81 cm in length. This detector was characterized so that 
the measured spectra can directly be converted to dose rates 
in terms of ambient dose equivalent, H*(10). In addition to 
measurements in photon fields of calibration facilities, 
Monte Carlo simulations were performed by using the codes 
GEANT4 (4) (with the EMLivermore physics list), MCNP 
and Penelope. In Figure 1, the simulated conversion 
function from incidents (counts in the detector’s pulse 
height spectrum) to dose (in pSv; pSv = picosievert) is 
shown for the two different CeBr3 detectors. The conversion 
function of the larger crystal is smaller due to the larger 
volume and hence the higher photon detection efficiency. 
The detailed description of the used method to convert 
counts to dose and the performance of the detector system 
can be found in (5). The inherent background spectra of 
both detectors were measured at PTB’s low background 
underground laboratory UDO II (6) within a lead castle 
which reduces the already very low background radiation 
level of UDO II (1.4 nSv/h) by more than an order of 
magnitude. 
These measurements proved that the inherent 
background of the CeBr3 crystal is negligible if environmental 
measurements are performed. With respect to weight 
(payload) limitations of the small UAV available at PTB, a 
light-weight photo-multiplier base from Bridgeport was 
used, including a readout electronics with digital pulse 
processing. In combination with a Raspberry Pi 3B for the 
detector control and a “power bar” a continuous operation 
of the detector system of 6 h is possible. The recorded 
gamma spectra are stored in an on-board database which 
facilitates working with the data and allows the retrospective 
analysis of time series.
In another approach, a rather heavy HPGe detector with 
electrical cooling system is adapted to a big helicopter drone 
(maximum payload of about 100 kg). Another group is 
responsible for equipping a UAV with a source localisation 
system.
In a later stage of the project, the airborne mapping of 
activity concentrations using UAV-based light-weight 
spectrometry systems will be possible. There is a trade-off 
between measuring time and measuring precision. To be 
able to map an area with significant spatial resolution, a 
measuring interval of a few seconds has to be realised. This 
means that the efficiency of the detector system has to be 
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sufficiently high. Figure 2 shows the results of a test 
measurement where a detector with a 3.81 x 3.81 cm CeBr3 
crystal was irradiated by an uncollimated 137Cs-source. The 
measuring time of each spectrum was 2 s. In this case of 
an artificial dose rate of 260 nSv/h, corresponding to a 
137Cs-contamination level of about 70 kBq/m2, the 662 keV 
line of 137Cs can be easily identified (inset) and the dose 
rate reference value (red line) can be reproduced well within 
a range of ±10% as indicated by the red dashed lines. The 
standard deviation of the mean value of 252 nSv/h is 8%.
Addressing the problems of data acquisition on-board 
of a UAV, data transmission between the UAV and the 
ground station and swift and clear data visualisation at the 
ground station, new software was developed which includes 
modules for different spectrometry detection systems. The 
software is called RIMASpec. A proof of concept of this 
software has been carried out by investigating the ability 
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Figure 1 Comparison of the energy-dependent conversion functions of two CeBr3 detector systems comprising of a 2.54 cm x 2.54 
cm and a 3.81 cm x 3.82 cm scintillation crystal, respectively, based on simulated spectra calculated with the MC code GEANT 4, 
including the low-energy Library of EM-Livermore
Figure 2 Test results from a measuring campaign on PTB’s premises, where an uncollimated free field irradiation facility was operated. 
This facility can also be used for the simulation of a by-passing radioactive plume (6). The spectra (inset) are recorded every 2 s and 
the average dose rate during these 2 s is calculated for each spectrum individually. Most measured dose rate values lie in a 10% range 
around the reference value of 259 nSv/h indicated by the dashed lines
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of a CdZnTe detector mounted on a DJI 550 multirotor to 
detect a 99mTc source, which was positioned at an aerial site. 
A complete description of the RIMA-spec software and the 
results of the test measurement has been compiled and 
published in (7).
These first results of activities within WP1 “Unmanned 
aerial detection systems” are very promising. Even a 2 
second integration time is sufficient to identify 137Cs as the 
source of an additional dose rates of 260 nSv/h and the dose 
rate values derived from the pulse height spectra show only 
small statistical variations (less than ±10%). 
The development of transportable air-sampling systems 
within WP2 has started only recently. A summary of the 
previous achievements, within the MetroERM project, is 
given in (8).
In order to investigate the performance of measuring 
instruments used in non-governmental dosimetry networks 
(MINNs), as a central activity of WP3, PTB, ENEA, NPL 
and VINCA have selected and commissioned a representative 
variety of MINNs for test purposes and for systematic 
metrological investigations. The first results of these studies 
will become available next year and will be published 
elsewhere. A summary of a first analysis within WP3 was 
presented during the 3rd European Radiological Protection 
Research Week by G. Iurlaro et. al.
To analyse the most widespread MINNs in Europe, as 
a first step, several private companies and non-profit 
organisations were selected. The techniques used to measure 
radioactivity and convert raw data to values were 
investigated. Furthermore, a representative variety of 
measuring instruments used in each network were selected 
for test purposes at metrological reference facilities within 
the consortium. Table 1 shows the selected measuring 
instruments used in non-governmental networks in Europe.
Within Work Package 4 “Passive dosimetry for 
environmental radiation monitoring”, passive detector 
systems intended to be deployed for long-term monitoring 
of contaminated areas in the aftermath of a radiological 
accident were studied. As a first step, the status of radiation 
monitoring in Europe using passive detectors was 
investigated. Within an intercomparison exercise at PTB, 
basic properties of 38 passive dosimetry systems were tested 
using different measuring sites. For this purpose, passive 
area dosimeters were supplied by European measuring 
services or bodies to be tested under the same irradiation 
conditions. Four dosemeters of each participant were 
exposed for 6 months at the reference site for ambient 
radiation, four other dosimeters were exposed for 6 months 
at the reference site for cosmic radiation and eight 
dosimeters were irradiated in a primary 137Cs‑photon field 
of the PTB at two angles. Four transport dosimeters were 
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Table 1 Instruments used in non-governmental networks in Europe selected for test purposes at metrological reference facilities within 
the consortium
Example of MINN Supplier Networks 
uRAD Monitor Model A Magna SCI uRad Monitor 
GMC-600 GQ Electronics GMC map 
bGaiger Nano Safecast Safecast 
Radalert 100 International Medcom Radiation Network/Safecast 
GMC-320 Plus GQ Electronics GMC map / Radmon 
GMC-500 Plus GQ Electronics GMC map / Radmon 
uRAD Monitor model KIT1 Magna SCI uRad Monitor 
Monitor 4 Geiger Count KIT S.E. International Inc. Radiation Network 
GMC-300 Plus GQ Electronics GMC map 
RADEX 1212 Quarta-RAD Inc. GMC map/ RadexRead Radiation Mapping 
PMR 7000 Mazur Radiation Network 
Monitor 200 S.E. International Inc. Radiation Network 
uRAD Monitor Model D Magna SCI uRad Monitor 
MyGeiger ver.3 PRO DIY RH Electronics Radmon 
Inspector Alert International Medcom Radiation Network 
Rad 100 International Medcom Radiation Network/Safecast 
Figure 3 Passive dosimeters exposed at the PTB reference site 
for environmental radiation. Active reference dosimeters are 
visible in the middle of the site
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Figure 4 Response of European dosimetry systems to combined terrestrial and cosmic radiation. The ideal response is exactly 1. The 
dosimeters were exposed for 6 months on the PTB reference measuring site for environmental radiation as shown in Figure 3. The 
systems (participants) are anonymised. Most systems are based on TLD detectors
stored at UDO II, the underground laboratory of PTB, while 
the other dosimeters were exposed above ground. In total, 
760 passive dosimeters were exposed. PTB supplied 
reference values independently, which are traceable to the 
primary standards and which are derived from a set of active 
detectors permanently run on the free‑field site.
Most of the passive dosimetry systems showed results, 
which are in agreement with the reference values within a 
ratio of 0.77 to 1.43 (the inverse of a corrections factor of 
±30%). In many cases, even a better agreement was found, 
as shown in Figure 4. However, some systems clearly failed. 
The results obtained in the PTB irradiation facility reveal 
information on the home calibration of the participants and 
the angular dependence of the detector systems. Flat 
detector holders, actually constructed for personal 
monitoring, often have a pronounced angular dependence, 
when exposed in the environment. This may lead to a high 
uncertainty, when measurements are performed in a 
surrounding with an inhomogeneous radiation field. A 
tendency was found to overestimate the contribution of the 
secondary cosmic radiation to the total dose. This has to be 
taken into account when the terrestrial component and 
contamination levels are derived.
All participating institutions were informed about the 
complete results. If measured data showed significant 
deviations from the reference values, the involved 
institutions were notified, in order to allow them to 
investigate the reasons for their poor results. This 
intercomparison is an important contribution to the quality 
assurance of dosimetry services dealing with passive 
dosimetry and will help the services to improve their 
performance and finally reduce their measurement 
uncertainties. 
CONCLUSION
A brief description of the “Preparedness” project and 
first results are given and regularly updated in its Publishable 
summary (9). Further information, especially for 
collaborators and stakeholders, can be found on the project’s 
website (10).
After the first year of the “Preparedness” project, the 
first results became available. This paper presents the 
project, its background, and the main objectives as well as 
a selection of first and promising results, especially 
concerning the operation of scintillator-based spectrometry 
systems on unmanned aerial vehicles in case of a nuclear 
or radiological event. 
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